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With oblivious transfer multiparty protocols become pos-
sible even in the presence of a faulty majority. But all known
protocols can be aborted by just one disruptor.
This paper presents more robust solutions for multiparty
protocols with oblivious transfer. This additional robustness
against disruptors weakens the security of the protocol and
the guarantee that the result is correct. We can observe a
trade off between robustness against disruption and security
and correctness.
We give an application to quantum multiparty protocols.
These allow the implementation of oblivious transfer and the
protocols of this paper relative to temporary assumptions, i.e.,
the security increases after the termination of the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a multiparty protocol a set P of players wants to cor-
rectly compute a function f(a1, . . . , an) which depends
on secret inputs of n players. Some players might col-
lude to cheat in the protocol as to obtain information
about secret inputs of the other players or to modify the
result of the computation.
Using oblivious transfer multiparty protocols for ar-
bitrary functions can be carried out with unconditional
security if all players are willing to cooperate [1,8,5]. But
already one disruptor can abort the protocol without be-
ing identified.
This contribution generalizes the unconditionally se-
cure multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer to the
case where we don’t only care about security and cor-
rectness but also about robustness against disruptors.
The basic idea is to define protocols where either no
possible collusion of disruptors can abort the protocol or
a cheater is identified unambiguously. Then the protocol
can be restarted without the cheater.
To be able to enhance the robustness of protocols we
have to make some assumptions about possible collu-
sions. We model possible collusions by defining a set
of collusions. Only one of these possible collusions is ac-
tually cheating. Within this set of colluding players the
players share their input and take actions based on their
common knowledge.
Definition 1 An adversary structure is a monotone set
A ⊆ 2P , i. e., for subsets S′ ⊆ S of P the property S ∈ A
implies S′ ∈ A. By assumption one set of A contains all
cheaters.
The main properties of a multiparty protocol are:
1. A multiparty protocol is said to be A-secure if no
single collusion fromA is able to obtain information
about the secret inputs of other participants which
cannot be derived from the result and the inputs of
the colluding players.
2. A multiparty protocol is A-partially correct if no
possible collusion can let the protocol terminate
with a wrong result.
3. A multiparty protocol is A-correct whenever no sin-
gle collusion from A can abort the protocol, modify
its result, or deviate from the protocol in a way that
an honest player obtains information about the se-
cret inputs of another player which cannot be de-
rived from the result and the input of this honest
player.
4. A multiparty protocol is called A-fair if no collu-
sion from A can reconstruct the result of the multi
party computation earlier then all honest partici-
pants together. No collusion should be able to run
off with the result.
A multiparty protocol having the properties 1., 2. and
4. is called A-partially robust and a protocol having all
four above properties is called A-robust.
By assumption one set of A contains all players who
deviate from the protocol. Hence we demand security
against only one possible collusion which has to contain
all cheaters as well as all disruptors.
Sometimes a set M is able to reconstruct a secret due
to the cheating of players who are not contained in M .
In this situation we will always look at the complete set
of cheaters necessary to obtain this situation. So even
in an A-secure protocol with M ∈ A it can happen that
the players of M can reconstruct a secret if some players
outside of M are cheating, too.
All players are considered to be curious, i. e., even the
honest players will try to learn as much as possible from
the information accessible while following the protocol.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
A. Multiparty Computations with Private Channels
We will summarize next what can be achieved by clas-
sical multiparty computations when private channels are
available between any two players as well as a broadcast
channel. The next result is taken from [9] for a history
see references therein.
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Theorem 2 Given a set P of players with an authenti-
cated secure channel between each pair of players together
with a broadcast cannel, then every function can be com-
puted by an A-partially robust multiparty protocol if no
two sets from A cover the complete set P of players.
But if we additionally conslider disruption the result
does not hold any more:
Remark 3 There exist functions for which a multiparty
protocol among players who have access to a broadcast
channel and have authenticated secure channels connect-
ing every pair of players cannot be A-robust if two collu-
sions cover P \ {Pi} for some player Pi.
Proof: Whenever two players mutually accuse each
other to not use the secure channels approriately it is
not possible for the remaining honest players to decide
which of the two players is cheating and the secure chan-
nel between the two players cannot be used.
If the players of two possible collusions A1, A2 ∈ A
covering P \{Pi} cannot use the secure channels between
them for the above reason, then again it is not clear for Pi
which of the two possible collusion is cheating. To con-
tinue with the protocol all messages between players who
are complaining about each other have to be exchanged
over the broadcast channel or over secure channels via
Pi. Obviously Pi learns all secrets or the protocol must
be aborted. In both cases the protocol is not A-robust.
✷
B. Multiparty Computations with Oblivious
Transfer
This subsection summarizes the previous work on mul-
tiparty protocols with oblivious transfer.
In the following we will always think of the oblivious
transfer channel as being a stronger primitive than au-
thenticated private channels. All oblivious tranfer chan-
nels in the remainder of this paper are authenticated and
secure and we will not state these properties any more.
Given an oblivious transfer channel all secure two party
computations become possible with perfect security [11].
This result was generalized to allow multiparty compu-
tations with a dishonest majority [1,8,5]. One obvious
problem with such protocols is that if a majority of play-
ers cannot run off with the secret, i. e., they cannot re-
construct the secret on their own, then a minority of
players can abort the protocol. This is problematic if it
is not clear who is cheating otherwise the protocol could
be restarted without the cheaters. To capture what can
be achieved in this case we made the distinction between
partial correctness and correctness.
The result of [1,8,5] can then be stated as
Theorem 4 Given an oblivious transfer channel between
any two players as well as a broadcast channel then every
function can be realized by a ∅-robust, 2P -secure, 2P -fair,
and 2P -partially correct multiparty protocol.
III. MORE ROBUST MULTIPARTY
PROTOCOLS: AN OVERVIEW
In this section we shortly overview the protocol pre-
sented in this paper to simplify reading. We shortly ex-
plain the basic primitives of [5] and sketch our changes to
the protocol to obtain more robustness. All these changes
will be carried out in detail in the following sections.
As long as no conflict occurs we will follow the protocol
of [5], but whenever disruption takes place we will deviate
from the protocol in a way that either resolves the prob-
lem or a cheater is identified. Then the protocol can be
restarted without the cheater. The exclusion of a player
has an impact on the value of the function to be com-
puted. The best way to deal with this would be to have
a default input like “unvalid” in a voting scheme. But
the effect of the exclusion of such a player is not severe as
the player was a cheater anyway and could as well have
chosen a random input. We will not discuss this further
as the discussion depends strongly on the function to be
implemented. There is one more problem with restart-
ing a protocol. If the inputs were time critical someone
might force a restart just to be able to change his inputs,
this will be avoided in Remark 36.
To be able to restart the protocol without players who
did try do disrupt the protocol we have to be able to
identify cheaters. To do this we will replace the subpro-
tocols used in [5] by primitives which either terminate
successfully or a cheater is identified.
Following [5] we will first give a bit commitment pro-
tocol which binds a player to all other players and allows
for zero knowledge protocols of linear relations on com-
mitted bits. In Section VI we will introduce a protocol
which either successfully creates such a bit commitment
or a cheater is identified.
Based on this bit commitment one can generate dis-
tributed bit commitments where a bit is shared among
all players and each player is committed to his “share”.
Section VII gives a protocol which either successfully cre-
ates such a distributed bit commitment or a cheater is
identified.
In [5] a committed oblivious transfer protocol was in-
troduced which allows to implement the boolean func-
tion AND on distributed bit commitments. Section VIII
gives a variant of this protocol which allows to identify
a cheater in the case that the protocol fails. The same
techniques allow to implement a NOT function on a dis-
tributed bit commitment.
with these boolean function we can realize every
boolean function on distributed bit commitments by cir-
cuit evaluation.
The outline of the complete protocol, given in Sec-
tion IX, then is:
Initialization Phase: All players have to agree on
the function to be computed as well as on the circuit F
to be used, they have to agree on an adversary structure
A such that the protocol will be A robust and all players
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have to agree on the security parameters. Furthermore
the players agree on how to, in case of a restart of the
protocol, choose the input of a cheater which has been
excluded from the protocol.
Then all players create distributed bit commitments to
commit to their inputs. All players will be able to gener-
ate distributed bit commitments or a cheater is identified
and the protocol can be restarted without the cheater.
Computing Phase: The circuit F is evaluated us-
ing AND and NOT gates on the distributed bit com-
mitments. Each of these boolean gates is either applied
successfully or a cheater is identified and the protocol can
be restarted without him.
Revelation Phase: The result of a computation is
hidden in the “shares” of distributed bit commitments.
These have to be unveiled in a way to ensure the fair-
ness of the protocol. Following [5] this can be done by
techniques known in the literature [3,8].
In Section XI we analyze the situation after the proto-
col has terminated. After the termination we can make
more precise statements about the security.
IV. MORE ROBUST MULTIPARTY
PROTOCOLS: WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE
The aim of this contribution is to enhance the robust-
ness of multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer. No
possible collusion should be able to abort the protocol.
This results in a tradeoff between security, parial cor-
rectness, and robustness which will be analyzed in the
following.
We first give a bound on the robustness which can be
achieved. The bound is tight as our protocols reach this
bound.
Lemma 5 Let P be a set of players for which each pair
of players is connected by an oblivious transfer channel
and each player has access to a broadcast channel. Then
A-robust multiparty computations are impossible for all
functions if two sets of A cover P \ {Pi} for a player
Pi ∈ P or |P | = 2.
Proof: Whenever two players mutually accuse each
other to not properly use the oblivious transfer channel
it is impossible for the remaining honest players to decide
which of the two players is actually refusing to cooperate.
Let A and B be two possible collusions covering P \{Pi},
such that all the players from A are in conflict with all
the players from B about refusing to use the oblivious
transfer channel. Then the oblivious transfer channels
between the players of A and the players of B cannot be
used and it is impossible for Pi to decide who is cheating.
The player Pi must assist the players from A and B.
As no other player can assist we are in the three party
situation with an oblivious transfer channel only between
a player Alice and Pi and a player Bob and Pi. For each
bit being transferred from Alice to Bob the player Pi
knows either as much as Alice about this bit or he knows
as much as Bob. The players Alice and Bob cannot agree
on a bit known to both without Pi knowing it, too. Many
functions can hence not be computed by multiparty pro-
tocols in this situation. ✷
V. THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS
In this paper we will often take actions depending on an
analysis of the complaints some players have broadcasted
about other players. For this we introduce the notion of
a conflict and look at the computational complexity of
such an analysis.
Definition 6 We say that two players Pi, Pj ∈ P are in
conflict with each other if all honest players can derive
that one of the two players is cheating.
Whenever all honest players can conclude that either
all players from a set A ⊆ P or all players from a set
B ⊆ P are cheating we say that these two sets are in
conflict with each other.
E. g. if a player accuses some other player of cheating
these two players are in conflict as either the first player
is lying or the second is cheating. Every honest player
must complain about every player he knows is cheating.
A player who does not report every cheating he detects
is thought to be colluding with the dishonest players.
It is clear from the definition that two sets A,B are in
conflict if and only if every player from A is in conflict
with every player from B.
With the set P of players and the conflicts which oc-
cured we can define a graph of conflicts. Together with
the adversary structureA we will call it the conflict struc-
ture.
Definition 7 A graph Γ with the set P being the vertices
and two vertices being connected by an edge iff the two
players are in conflict is called the graph of conflicts.
A pair (Γ,A) with Γ = (P,E) being a graph of con-
flicts and A ⊆ 2P being an adversary structure is called
a conflict structure.
To be able to identify possible collusions which could
or cannot be responsible for a given graph of conflicts we
define the vertex cover.
Definition 8 For a graph Γ = (P,E) a vertex cover is
defined as a subset of the vertices which contains for every
edge at least one vertex incident with this edge.
To get results about the complexity of some problems
concerning conflict structures we recall the t-vertex cover
problem. The t-vertex cover problem is the problem to
decide for a given graph if it contains a vertex cover of
size t or less. In the following it is of interest that this
decision problem is known to be NP-complete [7].
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Remark 9 Let (Γ,A) be a conflict structure and let C
denote the set of vertex covers of Γ = (P,E). Then the
set of all cheaters is contained in C∩A. If no vertex cover
of Γ is contained in A then the assumption that the set
of all cheaters is contained in A is violated.
Proof: By assumption one set of A contains all
cheaters, so we have to show that a set from A which
is not a vertex cover cannot contain all cheaters. This is
trivial as for every set M from A which is not a vertex
cover of Γ there exists a pair of players who are in conflict
but neither of them is contained in M . By the definition
of conflicts one of the two is cheating, but not contained
in M and thus M cannot contain all cheaters.
If no vertex cover of Γ is contained in A, then for ev-
ery set M of A there exists a pair of players who are in
conflict but neither of them is contained in M . Hence
no set of A contains all cheaters and the assumption is
violated. ✷
One can view C∩A as the updated adversary structure
after taking into account the conflicts present.
The above remark yields a simple, but not efficient,
algorithm, to identify a cheater whenever a cheater can
be identified based on the conflict structure present.
Lemma 10 Let (Γ,A) be a conflict structure, let C de-
note the set of vertex covers of Γ = (P,E), and let M be
the set of all cheaters which can be identified by deduction
from the conflict structure.
Then
M =
⋂
S∈C∩A
S.
Proof: For every vertex coverC ∈ C∩A it is consistent
with the conflict structure to assume that only the players
in C are cheating. Hence if there exists a vertex cover
C ∈ C ∩A which does not contain a specific player, then
this player need not be a cheater. So whenever a cheater
can be identified by deduction from the conflict structure
he must be contained in
⋂
S∈C∩A S. On the other hand
if this intersection is not empty then every player in this
intersection must be cheating as one set of C∩A contains
only cheaters, which follows from Remark 9. ✷
So either M =
⋂
S∈C∩A S is empty or a cheater can be
identified.
Next we will have a short look at the complexity of de-
cision problems related to conflict structures. If e. g. one
player has doubts about the validity of the assumption it
is, in the worst case, difficult to test if a conflict structure
is consistent with the assumption that only one set of A
contains cheaters.
Lemma 11 For a given conflict structure (Γ,A) decid-
ing if the assumption that only one set of A contains
cheaters is consistent with the graph of conflicts Γ is NP-
complete.
Proof: If we set A to be the set of all subsets of P
with at most t players, then deciding consistency with
a given conflict graph Γ is the same as deciding if there
exists a vertex cover with at most t vertices. This is
NP-complete [7]. ✷
In the worst case it is also difficult to identify a cheater
by deduction from the conflict structure.
Lemma 12 Identifying a cheater by deduction from a
given conflict structure (Γ,A) is NP-hard.
Proof: We show that a search algorithm which can
identify a cheater whenever a cheater can be identified
by deduction from the conflict structure can be used to
decide if a graph has a unique vertex cover of cardinality
t.
We let A be the set of all subsets of P with at most t
elements. Let identify(Γ) be a search algorithm which
identifies a cheater if it is possible to identify a cheater.
We will use this algorithm to decide if there is a unique
solution to the vertex cover problem. As this uniqueness
problem is NP-hard we then have shown the problem
of identifying cheaters to be NP-hard (see [10] for the
uniqueness problem and [7] for the uniqueness preserving
reduction of vertex cover to the satisfiability problem).
To find a unique vertex cover (and hence decide its
existence) we run identify(Γ) if no cheater is identified
then there is not a unique solution. If a cheater p ∈ P is
identified we restrict our graph Γ to P \ {p}. We repeate
this procedure until identify has either found enough
cheaters such that they form a vertex cover, which then
must be a unique vertex cover, or not enough cheaters
can be identified and no unique vertex cover exists. ✷
A protocol for which it is necessary to identify cheaters
whenever possible can be impractical for large numbers
of players. Fortunately the protocols of this paper need
to identify cheaters only in situations where one player is
in conflict with a set of players which is not contained in
A. This player is hence easily identified as a cheater. But
we still have to be careful because with an inappropriate
presentation of the adversary structure A it can even be
difficult to decide membership in A.
Remark 13 Let the adversary structure A be given by
sets A1, . . . , Am such that A = {A|∃i ≤ m : A ⊆ Ai}.
Let the sets A1, . . . , Am be given by one boolean function
f(b1, . . . , bn) such that each input bit bi corresponds to
a player Pi ∈ P and a set A is in {A1, . . . , Am} if the
assigment
bi =
{
1 if Pi ∈ A
0 else
is a satisfying assignment. Then deciding membership
in A is NP-complete.
Proof: Deciding membership in A for a set A is clearly
in NP as one can guess a superset of A which yields a
satisfying assignemnet for f .
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On the other hand we can reduce the satisfiability
problem to deciding membership in A. As A contains
for every set A ∈ A all the subsets of A the boolean
function f has a satisfying truth assignment iff for one
player Pi we have {Pi} ∈ A. ✷
VI. COMMITTING TO ALL PLAYERS
To ensure correctness of a multiparty protocol all play-
ers should be committed to their inputs and to shares of
intermediate results they hold. Furthermore they should
be able to give zero knowledge proofs about properties of
their inputs.
A. Previous Results
To be able to give zero knowledge proofs about prop-
erties of commitments we use the following construction
which can be found in [5].
Definition 14 A bit commitment with Xor (BCX) to a
bit b is a commitment to bits b1L, b2L, . . . , bmL, b1R, . . . ,
bmR such that for each i biL ⊕ biR = b.
The following result about zero knowledge proofs on
BCX can as well be found in [5] and in references therein.
Theorem 15 Bit commitments with Xor allow zero
knowledge proofs of linear relations among several bits
a player has committed to using BCX. Especially
(in)equality of bits or a bit string being contained in a
linear code.
Furthermore BCXs can be copied, as proofs may de-
stroy a BCX.
Proof: We will not state a full proof here as it can be
found in [5]. But we will restate the copying procedure
as it is an important subprotocol of all of the following
protocols.
Suppose Alice is committed to Bob to a bit b and wants
two instances of this commitment. Then Alice creates 3m
pairs of bit commitments such that each pair Xors to b.
Then Bob randomly partitions these 3m pairs in three
subsets of m pairs, thus obtaining three BCX and asks
Alice to prove the equality of the first new BCX with her
BCX for b. This destroys the old BCX and one of the
new BCX, but an honest Alice can thereby convince an
honest Bob that the two remaining BCX both stand for
the value b. ✷
Note that following this protocol of [5] it is possible
for a cheater to, with a polynomial probability, create an
incorrect BCX where a small (constant) number of pairs
biL, biR of plainly committed bits have an Xor unequal
to the bit committed by the BCX. This does not harm
the rest of the multiparty computation as such a small
inconsistency either has no influence on the result or it
is detected in the course of the protocol and leads to a
conflict as a zero knowledge proof or an unveil will be not
accepted (the same remark is necessary after Lemma 19).
In a multiparty scenario it is necessary that a player
should be committed to all other players.
Definition 16 A global bit commitment with Xor
(GBCX) consists of BCX commitments from one player
from P to a set of players which cannot be a collusion
such that all players are convinced that this player did
commit to the same bit in all the different BCX.
Corollary 17 Zero knowledge proofs of linear relations
among several GBCX are possible. Furthermore a GBCX
can be copied by copying the individual BCX.
For us it will be enough if a non-collusion (a set of
players trustable by definition) is convinced by the zero
knowledge proof.
B. Making Commitments More Robust
We will use the GBCX protocol as it is presented in [5]
to bind a committing party to a set of players which
cannot all collude with the sender. Hence the bit cannot
be changed by any allowed collusion.
As the protocol for generating a GBCX needs coin toss-
ing as a subroutine we will briefly show that coin tossing
is possible if no two possible collusions cover the complete
set of players.
Remark 18 Given a set P of n players having access
to a broadcast channel and let every pair of players be
connected by an oblivious transfer channel, then A-robust
coin tossing is possible if no two collusions of A cover P .
Proof: Every player chooses a random bit and com-
mits to it to every other player. Then the bits are opened
using the broadcast channel. Some players might com-
plain about other players. Every bit accepted by a non-
collusion is called a valid bit. Then the result of the coin
tossing is chosen to be the Xor of the valid bits. Every
player whose bit is not accepted must be a cheater as
he is in conflict with a non collusion. As only a set of
players contained in A can be identified as cheaters and
no two sets of A cover P the bits of a non-collusion will
be accepted as valid. Therefore the resulting bit is really
random as it cannot be chosen by a collusion. ✷
It is easy to verify that after generating a GBCX ac-
cording to [5] the sender of the commitments is bound
to all players who did not complain about the sender.
Furthermore all players who did not complain are con-
vinced to hold commitments for the same bit. For a given
adversary structure A two cases can now occur:
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1. A set A ∈ A of players complains about the sender.
Then the sender is bound to all players of the com-
plement Ac of A except to himself. The complete
collusion necessary now to change the bit would be
Ac, which has to include the sender or the sender
would now complain about all other players and
leave the protocol.
2. A set A 6∈ A complains about the sender. Then the
sender has to leave the protocol.
Whenever the sender is in conflict with a set A of play-
ers then this player can only change his commitment by
colluding with all other players of Ac hence if no two
possible collusions of A cover the set P of players then
a player is either detected cheating or his commitment is
binding. The GBCX remains to be 2P -secure if used this
way.
Summarizing the above we can state the next result
without further proof.
Lemma 19 For a set P of players with each pair of play-
ers being connected by an oblivious transfer channel and
each player having access to a broadcast channel and an
adversary structure A for which no two possible collu-
sions cover P it is possible to A-partially robustly and
2P -securely generate a GBCX or a cheater can be iden-
tified.
Note that following this protocol of [5] it is possible for
a cheater to, with a polynomial probability, create an in-
correct GBCX where a few users have a small (constant)
number of pairs ajiL, a
j
iR of committed bits which have an
Xor unequal to the bit committed to by the GBCX. But
this does not harm the rest of the multiparty computa-
tion as such a small inconsistency either has no influence
on the result or it is detected in the course of the protocol
and leads to a conflict as a zero knowledge proof or an
unveil will be not accepted.
It is an interesting question if one could obtain a higher
partial correctness by sacrificing the 2P -securety, e. g., by
exploiting Lemma 24 to obtain oblivious transfer between
players in conflict. But we will leave this question open
in this paper.
VII. DISTRIBUTED BIT COMMITMENTS
Next we will consider the distributed bit commitment
of [5]. Such a distributed bit commitment consists of
several bit commitments each to a share of a bit. The
multiparty computation will later be computed on those
shares.
Definition 20 A distributed bit commitment (DBC) to
a bit b consists of n GBCX one held by each player of P
such that the Xor of all values of the individual GBCX
equals b.
If the DBC is constructed in a way that one player
knows how to unveil all the GBCX the DBC consists of
we say that it is a DBC of this player.
To create, according to [5], a DBC of a player (Alice)
each player creates a GBCX to a random bit and opens
it to Alice then Alice creates a GBCX such that the Xor
of all GBCX equals the bit b she wants to commit to.
The complete multiparty protocol will perform circuit
evaluation on the DBC of the players. The intermediate
results of this circuit evaluation will again be DBCs but
for these no player knows how to unveil all GBCX.
We will give a robust implementation of creating a
DBC of a player in our next result.
Lemma 21 Given an oblivious transfer channel between
any two players and let every player have access to a
broadcast channel, then for an adversary structure A
which does not contain two sets covering all of P an A-
partially robust multiparty protocol for creating a DBC of
a player (Alice) can be implemented which is 2P -secure
and if the protocol fails a cheater can be identified unam-
biguously
Proof: If Alice wants to generate a DBC for a bit b all
players have to commit to a random bit using GBCX and
then unveil this bit to Alice. Then Alice will generate a
GBCX such that the Xor of all the bits equal the bit b.
The problem is that all the GBCX are only unveiled
to Alice. Hence we cannot distinguish between a party
refusing to unveil to Alice and Alice just claiming so. All
other conflicts can be solved by Lemma 19.
So assume Alice to be in conflict with a set of play-
ers A while she is creating a DBC. Then we will force
the players from A to unveil their bits publicly. If some
players are unable to unveil we have identified cheaters.
We seem to loose a little bit of security or correctness
as the complement Ac of the set A can reconstruct the
secret. But as Alice is contained in Ac the secret can only
be recovered if Alice is cheating, too. If Alice is part of
the collusion the collusion does not learn anything new
by reconstructing Alices input bit. ✷
VIII. COMMITTED OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
Next we recall the definition of committed oblivious
transfer, the key protocol of [5].
Definition 22 Given two players Alice and Bob where
Alice is committed to bits a0, a1 and Bob is committed
to a bit b, then a committed oblivious transfer protocol
(COT) is a protocol where Alice inputs information on
her two commitments and Bob will input data of his com-
mitment and the result will be that Bob is committed to
ab.
In a global committed oblivious transfer protocol
(GCOT) all players are convinced of the validity of the
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commitments, i.e., that indeed Bob is committed to ab
after the protocol.
To achieve a robust version of this protocol
(Lemma 25) we will need an auxiliary protocol for-
ward oblivious transfer (Lemma 23) and a protocol which
successfully implements oblivious transfer even between
players who are in conflict or a cheater can be identified
(Lemma 24).
A. Forward Oblivious Transfer
In this subsection we will introduce a protocol which
allows a sender (Alice) to implement an oblivious transfer
to a receiver (Bob) she is in conflict with. We will need
the help of a third player (Carol) who will learn all the
data sent by Alice, but will be unable to alter the data
sent without getting in conflict with either Alice or Bob.
We call this protocol forward oblivious transfer as the
player Carol ”forwards” the data to Bob obliviously.
Lemma 23 For three players Alice, Bob, and Carol
where Carol is not in conflict with Alice or Bob it is
possible to implement a function Forward Oblivious
Transfer via Carol of (a0, a1, b) where Alice inputs two
bits a0, a1, Bob inputs a bit b, Carol learns the two bits
a0, a1, and Bob learns only the bit ab for his choice of
b. The protocol is 2{Alice,Bob,Carol}-partially robust or a
new conflict must arise.
Proof:
We prove the claims of the lemma for the following
protocol.
Forward Oblivious Transfer via Carol of (a0, a1, b)
1. Alice sends the bits a0, a1 to Carol.
2. Carol commits to a0, a1 to Alice and to Bob using
a GBCX involving only the players Alice, Bob, and
Carol. Then Carol opens the commitment to Alice
to convince her that she is now committed to a0, a1
to Bob.
3. Bob commits to a bit b to Carol.
4. Carol runs COT(a0, a1, b) with Bob.
For the security of the protocol we have to prove that
1. Alice and Carol cannot together learn the secret b
of Bob.
2. Bob alone cannot learn the secret a0, a1 of Alice
(together with Alice or together with Carol a0, a1
are not secret any more as they can be derived from
the input resp. output of the function.)
Point 1. is clear from the security of the COT protocol.
Point 2. follows directly from the security of the GBCX
protocol and the COT protocol.
To prove the partial correctness it is enough to prove
that Caro alone cannot alter the two bits without get-
ting in conflict with Alice or Bob. Alice can check if the
two bits Carol is committed to equal the bits she sent to
Carol because of the binding property of the GBCX bit
commitment. Bob can check if the bits Carol is commit-
ted to equal the bits Alice sent to Carol by the properties
of the COT protocol used. ✷
B. GCOT from Forward Oblivious Transfer
The player helping in the protocol forward oblivious
transfer learns all bits transmitted. To keep up the se-
curity we will use the protocol many times with different
helpers to obtain oblivious transfer even between play-
ers in conflict. Then the secret is distributed among all
helping players.
Lemma 24 Given an oblivious transfer channel between
any two players as well as a broadcast channel, then for
an adversary structure A for which no two sets cover
P \ {Pi} for any player Pi an A-partially robust, {A ⊆
P |Ac 6∈ A}-secure multiparty protocol for oblivious trans-
fer can be implemented such that the sender is committed
to what he sent and whenever a party complains about the
result of the protocol a new conflict arises.
Proof: If the sender and the receiver of an oblivious
transfer are not in conflict yet, then a new conflict arises
as soon as one party complains. So we are left with the
interesting case where the sender and the receiver are
already in conflict. In this situation we use the following
protocol:
Oblivious Transfer for players in conflict(a0, a1, b)
Let M be the set of players not in conflict with Alice or
Bob.
1. Bob chooses a bit b
2. For all p ∈ M do
(a) Alice chooses random bits a0,p, a1,p and per-
forms with Bob Forward Oblivious Trans-
fer via p of (a0,p, a1,p, b)
(b) If Alice or Bob gets in conflict with p then let
M := M \ {p}
3. Alice calculates a0⊕
⊕
p∈M a0,p and a1⊕
⊕
p∈M a1,p
and broadcasts these two bits.
We now prove the security, partial correctness, and
fairness of the above protocol.
Security: The secret bit b of Bob cannot be learnt by
anyone due to the security of the COT protocol. Now we
look at Alices secrets. Let B denote the set of players the
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receiver Bob is in conflict with andA be the set the sender
Alice is in conflict with. The players of the set M can
together reconstruct a secret of the sender Alice. But the
set M cannot contain all cheaters, the complete collusion
is larger. If Alice is honest (otherwise we don’t need to
protect her secret), then all players of A are cheaters
and have to be considered as part of the collusion. The
complete collusion able to reconstruct a secret bit and
containing all cheaters is then at least as large as A∪M =
Bc. The set B is contained in A, otherwise Bob would
have left the protocol, then Bc 6∈ A and no collusion of
A learns a secret. It remains to be shown that no honest
but curiuous player gets to know a secret. As |M | > 1,
because no two collusions cover all but one player, Alices
secret is always distributed among several honest players
and no single honest but curious player can reconstruct
it. We can conclude that the protocol is A-secure.
Partial correctness: According to Lemma 23 no player
of M can have altered the values of the bits without a
new conflict arising. At the end of the protocol the set
M contains only the players Alice and Bob are not in
conflict with. Thus the players of M cannot have altered
the bits, hence we even get 2P -partial correctness for this
protocol.
Fairness is not an issue here as only one player, Bob,
learns a result.
The sender is committed to bits a0, a1 as each player
p ∈ M is committed to the bits a0,p, a1,p the sender can
ask all players from M to open the bits. If the bits are
not opened correctly either the sender or the receiver will
object and a new conflict must arise between a player
from M and Alice or Bob.
✷
Our next result will show that all steps of the GCOT
protocol of [5] can be verified by other players except one
step involving an oblivious transfer between two players.
If a conflict arises in this step we can replace the oblivious
transfer by the protocol of Lemma 24.
Lemma 25 Let P be a set of players where each pair
of players is connected by an oblivious transfer channel
and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let
A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions
cover P \{Pi} for any player Pi. Then a GCOT protocol
can A-partially robustly and {A ⊆ P |Ac 6∈ A}-securely
be implemented between two players who are in conflict
or a cheater can be identified.
Proof: We will restate the GCOT protocol of [5] with-
out a proof of its security. Details can be found in [5].
Then we will carefully investigate the steps and see,
that by replacing GBCX with the modified protocol of
Lemma 19 and using the oblivious transfer of Lemma 24
each step either works, or a new conflict arises, or a
cheater is identified. The steps which did not work can be
repeated and eventually the protocol works or a cheater
can be identified unambiguously. In the restated proto-
col we will use the notation of [5]: indices are superscript
and OT(a0, a1)(b) denotes the Oblivious Transfer for
players in conflict(a0, a1, b) protocol of Lemma 24.
GCOT(a0, a1)(b)
1. All participants together choose one decodable [m, k, d]
linear code C with k > (1/2 + 2σ)m and d > ǫn for
positive constants σ, ǫ, efficiently decoding t errors.
2. Alice randomly picks c0, c1 ∈ C, commits to the bits c
i
0
and ci1 (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) of the code words, and proves
that the codewords fulfil the linear relations of C.
3. Bob randomly picks I0, I1 ⊂ {1, . . . ,M}, with |I0| =
|I1| = σm, I1 ∩ I0 = ∅ and sets b
i ← b for i ∈ I0 and
bi ← b for i 6∈ I0.
4. Alice runs OT(ci0, c
i
1)(b
i) with Bob who gets wi for i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. Bob tells I = I0 ∪ I1 to Alice who opens
ci0, c
i
1 for each i ∈ I .
5. Bob checks that wi = ci
b
for i ∈ I0 and w
i = cib for
i ∈ I1, sets w
i ← cib, for i ∈ I0 and corrects w using C’s
decoding algorithm, commits to wi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
and proves that w1 . . . wm ∈ C.
6. All players together randomly pick a subset I2 ⊂
{1, . . . ,m} with |I2| = σm, I2 ∩ I = ∅ and Alice opens
ci0 and c
i
1 for i ∈ I2.
7. Bob proves that wi = cib for i ∈ I2.
8. Alice randomly picks and announces a privacy ampli-
fication function h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} such that a0 =
h(c0) and a1 = h(c1) and proves a0 = h(c
1
0, . . . , c
m
0 ) and
a1 = h(c
1
1, . . . , c
m
1 ).
9. Bob sets a ← h(w), commits to a and proves a =
h(w1 . . . , wm).
As GBCX commitments as well as zero knowledge
proofs convincing a non collusion can be performed by
all players unless a cheater is identified (Lemma 19) the
honest behaviour of Alice and Bob can be checked by a
non collusion in all steps, but in step 4.
If now Bob claims that Alice cheated in step 4. then Al-
ice can open the codewords c0, c1 according to Lemma 24
then either Alice or Bob are caught cheating or if the
opening was not successful a new conflict must arise
(Lemma 24). If this is the case we repeat the steps 1.
to 4. with new random choices. After a finite number
of repetitions a cheater will be identified as there cannot
be arbitrarily many conflicts. As the codewords which
might have to be opened are random and not related to
Alices secret inputs no security is lost by restarting the
protocol. Hence the security is the same as stated in
Lemma 24. ✷
IX. CIRCUIT EVALUATION ON DBCS
In the previous sections we developed enough tools to
now state the complete protocol which very closely fol-
lows the protocol of [5], but uses the more robust proto-
cols for GBCX, DBC, and GCOT introduced so far. For
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the convenience of the reader we restate those results and
proofs of [5] needed to picture the complete protocol.
First we restate the definition of the boolean function
AND on commitments as we will use it for the multiparty
protocols later.
Definition 26 A pair and (PAND) is a protocol which
takes as input two BCX one from a player Alice and one
from a player Bob and outputs two BCX one for Alice
and one for Bob such that the Xor of the values of the
new BCX equal the AND of the values of the input BCX.
A global pair and (GPAND) is a generalization of
PAND to a set of players. Two active players (Alice and
Bob) perform a PAND in a way that all other players are
convinced of the Xor of the new commitments equals the
AND of the input values.
By and (AND) we will denote a protocol which takes
as input two DBC and outputs one DBC representing
the AND of the values of the input DBCs such that every
party is convinced of this.
In [5] it is shown how to obtain an AND on DBCs from
a protocol for GCOT:
Lemma 27 With the notation of Lemma 24 we have:
Given an oblivious transfer channel between any two
players and a broadcast channel then an A-partially ro-
bust and {A ⊆ P |Ac 6∈ A}-secure multiparty protocols for
GPAND and AND can be implemented such that when-
ever a party complains about the result of the protocol a
cheater is identified.
Proof: We restate the protocols from [5] to see that
they involve only primitives which can be dealt with ac-
cording to our results so far.
A PAND can be realized by the following protocol:
Alice is committed to a and Bob is committed to b. Then
Alice chooses a random bit a′ and runs COT(a′, a′⊕a)(b)
with Bob who gets b′. We have a′ ⊕ b′ = a ∧ b because
for b = 0 we have b′ = a′ and hence a′ ⊕ b′ = 0, for b = 1
we get b′ = a⊕ a′ and a′ ⊕ b′ = a.
For a GPAND protocol the COT protocol has to be
replaced by GCOT.
To evaluate an AND on DBCs we observe that
(
n⊕
i=1
ai) ∧ (
n⊕
j=1
bj) =
n⊕
i,j=1
(ai ∧ bj).
From this we can conclude that an AND operation on
DBCs can be realized by n2 GPAND one for each pair of
players and Xor operations for each player. ✷
To be able to make circuit evaluation for all possible
boolean functions we also need a NOT on DBCs.
Remark 28 Given a set P of players, a DBC of these
player, and an adversary structure A for which no two
sets of A cover P , then there exists a protocol which is
A-partially robust, 2P -secure, and successfully inverts the
bit the DBC stands for or a cheater is identified.
Proof: To implement such a NOT gate one player is
picked who must invert his GBCX (his “share” of the
DBC which represents a bit b). The player generates a
new GBCX and proves that it is unequal to the GBCX
he held before. This GBCX together with the GBCX of
the other players form a DBC for the inverted bit. ✷
All protocols presented so far are only A-partially cor-
rect, but they allow the identification of a cheater if they
fail. To obtain A-correct protocols from these we use a
very simple idea, we will restart the protocol every time it
failed without the players who have been caught cheat-
ing. The exclusion of cheating players can change the
value of the function to be computed. The best solution
to this problem would be to have a default input like “un-
valid”. But the effect of the exclusion of cheating players
does not affect the correctness of the protocol as a cheat-
ing player could as well have chosen a nonsensical input.
In Remark 36 we will deal with the problem that some
players might try to change their inputs after a restart.
With the protocols presented so far and restarting the
protocol if it fails we get:
Lemma 29 Using the notation of Lemma 24 we get:
Given an oblivious transfer channel between any two
players as well as a broadcast channel, then every func-
tion can be implemented by a multiparty protocol which
is A-robust and A˜-secure if the following conditions hold:
1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets
covering P \ {Pi} for any Pi ∈ P and
2. the adversary structure A˜ does not contain a com-
plement of a set of A.
Proof: According to Lemma 27 and Remark 28 we can
realize the boolean operation AND and NOT on DBCs
such that whenever the protocol fails a cheater is iden-
tified. Furthermore we can generate DBCs successfully
or a cheater will be identified (Lemma 21). Using these
techniques we will implement oblivious circuit evaluation.
The protocol will be restarted each time it had to be
aborted, but without the players which were identified
as cheaters.
We will next have to clarify how a protocol begins and
how it is ended. Below we will sketch the structure of the
comlete protocol, without mentioning possible restarts,
closely following [5].
Initialization Phase: All players have to agree on
the function to be computed as well as on the circuit F
to be used, they have to agree on an adversary structure
A such that the protocol will be A robust and all players
have to agree on the security parameters used and on a
code C for the GCOT protocol. Furthermore the players
agree on how to, in case of a restart of the protocol,
choose the input of a cheater which has been excluded
from the protocol.
Then all players create DBCs to commit to their in-
puts.
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Computing Phase: The circuit is evaluated using
AND and NOT gates on the input DBCs. If the circuit
requires several copies of a DBC then a DBC is copied by
copying the GBCX it consists of. A GBCX can be copied
by copying all its BCX with the procedure of Theorem 15.
Revelation Phase: The result of a computation is
hidden in DBCs. These have to be unveiled in a way
to ensure the fairness of the protocol. Following [5] we
use the techniques from [3,8] to fairly unveil the secret
information such that no collusion can run off with an
advantage of more than a fraction of a bit. Of course an
A˜-secure protocol cannot be more than A˜-fair. ✷
X. HIGHER SECURITY BY A MORE CAREFUL
ANALYSIS
The result of Lemma 29 is a little bit too pessimistic.
It does not take into account that the GCOT protocol
has to work only in one direction between every pair of
players. Exploiting this property we will be able to obtain
security against one more collusion B which may be a
complement of a set of the adversary structure A.
We first take a closer look at the situation when a
complement of a set from A contains all cheaters and is
able to reconstruct a secret bit:
Remark 30 If for an A-robust protocol implemented ac-
cording to Lemma 29 there exists a set B ∈ A such that
its complement Bc 6= P contains all cheaters and is able
to reconstruct a secret bit which cannot be reconstructed
from the input of the players from Bc and the output of
the protocol then all of the following conditions hold:
1. Lemma 24 was used to realize oblivious transfer be-
tween two players.
2. The receiver of this oblivious transfer is in conflict
with all players from a set containing B and is not
in conflict with any player who is in conflict with
the sender.
3. The sender of this oblivious transfer is honest and
the receiver is cheating.
Proof: By inspection of the Lemmata 29, 27, 24 we
can see, that the only step where the 2P -security is lost
is the use of Lemma 24. The secret which is distributed
when applying Lemma 24 is a secret of the sender in the
oblivious transfer by Lemma 24. Hence the 2P -security is
lost only if the sender was honest. To complete the proof
we look at the set which can reconstruct the distributed
secret.
Let a player (Alice) be in in conflict with a set A con-
taining a player Bob and Bob being in conflict with a
superset C of the set B. Of course C contains Alice.
If we use Lemma 24 to implement oblivious transfer be-
tween Alice and Bob then secret bits of Alice are dis-
tributed among the players of P \ (A ∪ C) a subset of
P \ (A ∪ B). If Alice is honest (otherwise we need not
protect her secret) then all players of A are cheating and
the complete collusion able to reconstruct secret bits of
Alice is A ∪ P \ (A ∪C) = (C \A)c a subset of (B \A)c.
The set (C\A)c contains all cheaters and can reconstruct
a secret of Alice, but it can only be a subset of Bc if A
and B are disjoint, i. e., if B does not contain any player
in conflict with the sender. ✷
From the proof of Lemma 29 and Lemma 27 we can
see that the GCOT within the AND protocol has to work
only in one direction between every pair of players. Using
this simple observation together with the above remark
we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Lemma 31 Let P be a set of n players with every pair of
players being connected by an oblivious transfer channel
and every player having access to a broadcast channel.
Let A and A˜ be adversary structures, then for all func-
tions A-robust and A˜-secure multiparty protocols exist if
1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets
covering P \ {Pi} for any Pi ∈ P and
2. the adversary structure A˜ contains only the com-
plement of one previously chosen set B which is
maximal in A.
Proof: Let B be any maximal set of A. In addition
to Lemma 29 we have to prove that we can additionally
prevent Bc from reconstructing any secret data.
From Lemma 30 we know that a complement of a max-
imal set B contains all cheaters and can reconstruct a
secret only if the receiver of an oblivious transfer by
Lemma 24 was in conflict with a superset of B. As B
is maximal either the receiver is detected cheating by be-
ing in conflict with a set not in A or the receiver has to
be in conflict with exactly all players from B. We keep in
mind that oblivious transfer, as well as GCOT, is needed
in one direction only between every pair of players. We
modify the protocol such that a player who is in conflict
with exactly the players of B always sends in an oblivious
transfer if it is implemented by Lemma 24. It remains to
be shown that it is impossible that the receiver and the
sender are in conflict with the players of B. Lemma 24 is
only employed if the sender and the receiver are in con-
flict. Hence the the sets of players the sender and the
receiver are in conflict with have to differ as no one can
be in conflict with himself. ✷
In the above result one can see the trade off between
robustness and security. The smaller A can be chosen
the larger A˜ will be.
XI. THE SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
AFTER TERMINATION
The result of Lemma 31 guarantees us A-robustness
and {A ⊆ P |Ac 6∈ A} ∪ {Bc}-security for a previously
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chosen B ∈ A, but the security can be even higher de-
pending on the course of the protocol. A trivial example
is that 2P -security is achieved if no player complained
during the protocol, because in this case the protocol
specializes to the protocol of [5].
In this section we want to derive the security the pro-
tocol guarantees from the knowledge one has after termi-
nation. We will see that the the security will be higher
than guaranteed by Lemma 31.
To clearly distinguish the security guaranteed in ad-
vance and the security which is actually obtained we will
speak of a priory security and a posteriori security.
Remark 32 Whenever no cheater can be identified and
two players (Alice and Bob) are in conflict with two dis-
joint maximal sets A, B of A respectively, then every
other conflict present must be a conflict between a player
from the set A and a player from the set B.
Proof: Let Alice be in conflict with the set A maximal
in A and Bob be in conflict with the set B maximal in
A and let A ∩B = ∅. Alice and Bob must be in conflict,
because only one collusion from A is cheating. Hence
Alice ∈ B and Bob ∈ A. We now look at any additional
conflict. This conflict has to involve a player from A
otherwise we could identify a cheater, because A would
not be a vertex cover of the conflict graph and Bob must
be cheating as he is in conflict with all players of A. For
the same reason one of the two players in conflict must
be contained in B else Alice would be caught cheating.
Hence every additional conflict is a conflict between a
player from the set A and a player from the set B. ✷
With this remark and further exploiting the fact that
oblivious transfer is needed only in one direction between
every pair of players we get the main result of this paper:
Theorem 33 Let P be a set of n players with every pair
of players being connected by an oblivious transfer chan-
nel and every player having access to a broadcast chan-
nel. Let A, A˜, and Â be adversary structures, then for all
functions A-robust multiparty protocols exist which are a
priori A˜-secure and a posteriori Â-secure if
1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets
covering P \ {Pi} for any Pi ∈ P ,
2. for a previously chosen set B maximal in A the
adversary structure A˜ does not contain any com-
plement of a set of A except Bc, and
3. there exists a set A (6= B) maximal in A such
that the adversary structure Â does not contain
any complement of a set of A except the sets of
{S ∈ A|S is maximal and S 6= A}.
Proof: All properties of A and A˜ were dealt with in
Lemma 31. Hence we will have to consider only the a
posteriori security in this proof.
To achieve the security stated in point 3. of the the-
orem we need one more modification of the protocol de-
veloped so far. Again we keep in mind that oblivious
transfer has to be used in one direction only between
every pair of players. We will introduce more rules regu-
lating the direction in which oblivious transfer has to be
used whenever Lemma 24 is employed.
1. If a player is in conflict with the set B then this
player sends only in an oblivious transfer which is
implemented by Lemma 24.
2. If a player is in conflict with a maximal set of A
and needs to employ Lemma 24, then this player
always sends to players who are not in conflict with
a maximal set of A.
3. If two players are in conflict with a maximal set of
A then we use a previously fixed order < on the set
of maximal sets of A. The player in conflict with
the maximal set larger with respect to the order <
sends and the player in conflict with the maximal
set smaller with respect to the order < receives.
To be consistent with the above the set B must be
maximal with respect to the ordering <.
These additional rules for the direction of oblivious
transfers are in accordance with the proof of Lemma 31.
Hence we don’t need to prove points 1. and 2. from the
above theorem as the proof of Lemma 31 still applies.
Now we prove point 3. of the above theorem.
A set Ac with A maximal in A is able to reconstruct
a secret only if the receiver of an oblivious transfer was
in conflict with the players of A and A does not contain
any players the sender is in conflict with (Remark 30).
Let the sender be in conflict with the players of a set A′
then A′ must be maximal in A or the direction of the
oblivious transfer would have to be different (point 2. of
the above enumeration). Furthermore A and A′ must be
disjoint as otherwise A would contain a player the sender
is in conflict with. We can conclude that a set Ac with
A maximal in A is able to reconstruct a secret only if
there exist two players each of which is in conflict with a
maximal set and these two sets are disjoint. From now on
we will consider only this situatiuon. From Lemma 32 we
know that in such a situation every conflict is a conflict
of a player from A and a player of A′. So whenever in
this case two players are in conflict with maximal sets of
A one set must be A and the other must be A′.
During an oblivious transfer which is implemented by
Lemma 24 only Ac or A′c could learn a secret bit, but
according to point 3. of the above enumeration the di-
rection of the oblivious transfer is always chosen in a way
that only among the players of one of these two sets se-
crets will be shared. So from the complements of the sets
which are maximal in A only one set is excluded from Â
all other sets of Â were already contained in A˜. ✷
Note that we cannot choose the adversary structure Â
as we cannot choose who will be in conflict with whom.
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But it is obvious that the adversary structure Â can be
read off the set of all conflicts which did occur during the
oblivious transfer steps of the protocol. So Â is known
after the protocol terminated.
Even after termination of a multiparty protocol there
is a difference between partial robustness and robustness.
After termination of a protocol no collusion can change
the result or abort the protocol anymore hence partial
robustness is equivalent to security then. But robustness
additionally requires that no single honest but curious
player learns a relevant secret if a collusion of players
leaks their secret data.
We will see in the following that there is a very easy re-
lation between security and robustness after termination
of a protocol. This allows us to describe the robustness
our protocols achieve during their execution and after
termination by Theorem 33 and the following lemma.
Lemma 34 A multi party protocol which is A-secure af-
ter termination is B-robust after termination for B =
{B|∃A ∈ A : B ⊂ A and B 6= A}.
Proof: After termination of the protocol no collu-
sion can change the result or abort the protocol anymore
hence the only problem left is that a collusion of play-
ers leaks their secrets. If a collusion leaks their secret
data it can happen that an honest but curious player
learns a secret without himself colluding. But it is obvi-
ous that for an A-secure protocol the collusion which is
leaking secrets plus the honest but curious player must
not be contained in A if the honest but curious player is
to learn a secret. Hence after termination the protocol is
B-robust for B = {B|∃A ∈ A : B ⊂ A and B 6= A}. ✷
Like the protocols of [5] our protocols are efficient as
none of our additional protocol steps needs non polyno-
mial resources.
Corollary 35 The protocols of Theorem 33 are efficient
in the number n of players and the size of the circuit used
to evaluate the function to be computed.
One problem is left. If the inputs of the multiparty
computation are time critical we have to keep the play-
ers from changing their inputs if the protocol has to be
restarted.
Remark 36 To avoid that players change their inputs in
a restarted protocol one can let every player commit to his
inputs by GBCX before the protocol starts. When restart-
ing the protocol the players have to prove the equality of
their newly generated DBC and their original inputs.
As the inputs could even depend on the conflicts ap-
pearing we don’t allow any complaints in the commit
phase before the protocol until all players claim to have
committed to all other players.
Following this remark it is clear that every player which
will not be caught cheating had to commit his input to a
non collusion. This is enough to ensure that every player
who will not be expelled from the protocol cannot change
the input he committed to following the above remark.
XII. AN APPLICATION TO QUANTUM
MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS
The main problem with quantum protocols like bit
commitment is that measurements can be delayed
thereby allowing one party to cheat [14,12]. In [15] se-
cret sharing is used to force honest measurements, fol-
lowing ideas from [4,16]. Once these measurements are
performed the assumptions about possible collusions can
be loosened. This kind of temporary assumptions are a
very interesting feature of quantum cryptographic proto-
cols. In [15] the following result is proven:
Corollary 37 Let P be a set of players for which each
pair of players is connected by a quantum channel and
an authenticated insecure channel and every player has
access to a broadcast channel. Let A be an adversary
structure for which no two collusions cover the set P \
{Pi} for any player Pi and let M be any maximal set
in A. Then for every pair of players, who will not be in
conflict after the protocol, an oblivious transfer is possible
from one of the two players to the other player which is
A-robust and {Ac|A 6∈ A} ∪M c-secure.
The problem that oblivious transfer is only imple-
mentable between players not in conflict with each other
can be solved by the protocols of this paper as normal
oblivious transfer cannot be used sometimes as well if
players are in conflict. With the results of this paper we
are able to give a full proof of the main result of [15].
Theorem 38 Let P be a set of players each having ac-
cess to a broadcast channel and every pair of players of
P being connected by a quantum channel and an insecure
but authenticated classical channel. Then A-robust quan-
tum multiparty protocols for all functions exist if and only
if no two collusions of A cover P \ {Pi} for any player
Pi.
These protocols are A˜-secure after termination if and
only if the adversary structure A˜ contains at most one
complement of a previously chosen set from A.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We presented multiparty protocols with oblivious
transfer which can tolerate disruptors if no two possi-
ble collusions of active cheaters together contain all but
one players. This is optimal.
If the set of all possible collusions of active cheaters
is denoted by A then our protocols are A˜-secure for
an A˜ which does not contain only one complement of
a set of A. After termination the protocol is Â-secure
for an adversary structure Â which does not contain
any complement of a set of A except the sets of {S ∈
A|S is maximal and S 6= A}.
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Our result has implications on quantum cryptography
maybe opening new kinds of applications to quantum
channels.
We conjecture that the security of the presented pro-
tocols cannot be substantially improved. But the prob-
lems dealt with in this paper indicate that there might be
a more powerful cryptographic primitive than oblivious
transfer (we recently learnt about independent research
in this direction [6]). Every cheater has to take care not
to get into conflict with too many players, because the
cheater could then be identified. A more powerful prim-
itive could make it difficult to know whom one is cheat-
ing. A candidate could be an anonymous oblivious trans-
fer where the receiver is picked at random. Whenever a
player tries to send trash over an anonymous oblivious
transfer channel this player risks to be in conflict with
the receiver which is picked at random.
Another interesting question is whether such an anony-
mous oblivious transfer channel could be implemented—
relative to reasonable assumptions—by a quantum chan-
nel. This would imply that there exist situations in which
a quantum channel is cryptographically more powerful
than oblivious transfer.
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